UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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INTERNATIONAL CODE COUNCIL, : Case No.: 17-cv-6261

INC, et al.,

Plaintiffs,:

v. :

UPCODES, INC., et al., : New York, New York

Defendants.: August 1, 2023

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TRANSCRIPT OF STATUS CONFERENCE HEARING

BEFORE THE HONORABLE VALERIE FIGUEREDO

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

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THE DEPUTY CLERK: This is the matter of
International Code Council, Inc., et al., versus
UpCodes, Inc., et al.; Case Number: 17-cv-6261.
Honorable Valerie Figueredo presiding.
           Counsel, can you please give your
appearances for the record, starting with
plaintiffs' counsel.
           MS. WISE: Good morning. My name is Jane
Wise, counsel on behalf of International Code
Council, or ICC, and I'm joined by Kevin Fee and
Gabby Velkes.
           THE DEPUTY CLERK: Defense?
           MR. MARCISZEWSKI: Hi. This is Mark
Marciszewski on behalf of the defendant UpCodes, and
I'm joined by Gene Novikov.
           THE COURT: Good morning, everyone.
                                                This
is Judge Figueredo.
           So I have your two letters concerning the
discovery dispute, ECF 172 and 179. I think it
probably makes sense to just walk through the
various RFPs that are at issue. But before we do
that, I just -- you know, in reading the letters, I
was just a little confused as to what a reading room
is. And I think this came up in ICC's letter, so,
Ms. Wise or Mr. Fee or Ms. Velkes, if you want to
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just give me some context for what a reading room is...

MS. WISE: Sure. I'd be happy to do that. This is Ms. Wise.

A reading room in this context is simply ICC's website. It's an area on ICC's website where it makes all of its model building codes and various standards available to view for free, but there are limitations on what you can do from that website. So if you have Internet of any kind, whether it's on your cell phone, a tablet or on a traditional computer, you can go to ICC, click on codes, and then select from any of the 50 states that they have codes available for and review, for example, the Building Code of 2021 for a particular state. And you can do that by chapter and look at all of the various code provisions that you want to.

One of the disputes between the parties is, sort of, the functionality of that. So UpCodes, in its letter, talked about the ability to copy and paste, so that's not something that you can do from ICC's reading room. So when we refer to it as a "reading room," it's really the fact that it's free, but it's in a read-only format, so it can't be downloaded or copied and pasted into another

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      document.
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                 THE COURT: Okay. And this -- so -- and
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     this, I guess, is specific to Requests 2 and 3,
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     which offer the reading code available to the public
      for free?
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                 MS. WISE: I believe it's 2, 3 and 8.
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                 MR. MARCISZEWSKI: Yes, that's correct,
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     2, 3 \text{ and } 8.
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                 THE COURT: And so number 2 seeks all
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     documents relating to this -- I guess, to this
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     ability to look at the code in the reading room for
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      free.
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                 MS. WISE: Yeah. It says, "The free
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     online services through which ICC's code can be
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     accessed."
                 I think it's probably a little bit
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     broader than just ICC's reading room. There may be,
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     you know, another read-only source where ICC links
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     for a particular jurisdiction. But, yes, that's
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     essentially what Request 2 is talking about.
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                 THE COURT: And so, Mr. Marciszewski --
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     did I -- I'm sure I'm butchering that.
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                 MR. MARCISZEWSKI: Yeah, that's -- it's
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            It's Marciszewski. Thank you.
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                 THE COURT: I'm just trying to
         AMM TRANSCRIPTION SERVICE - 631.334.1445
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      understand. You say you want, for example, feedback
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      from users concerning the practical effect of the
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     restrictions ICC puts on its access.
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                 So is there, like, a comment board on
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      this reading room, or, I guess, you anticipate that
     someone accessing this would send an e-mail and say,
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     I can't copy and paste this?
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                 MR. MARCISZEWSKI: Yes.
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     essentially what RFP 8 is about. And, yes, I think
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      it's mainly also fair that we can pick certain
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     custodians if there is certain -- an e-mail address
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     customers send complaints to if they come in and say
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     I can't copy and paste, or I can't do X and Y, and,
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     therefore, this code is completely unusable to me.
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      That's something that's relevant then to Upcodes'
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     due process arguments that if -- this free access is
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     not actually making the codes practically available
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     to the public.
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                 MS. WISE: And I'm happy to respond to
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      that.
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                 THE COURT: Sure.
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                 MS. WISE: I'm sorry. I'm having a
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      little trouble hearing. Did you say something,
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     Judge?
25
                                  Yeah, yeah, yeah.
                 THE COURT: No.
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ahead.

MS. WISE: So I think there's a real conflation of issues here on the sort of -- the technical aspects of what users can do. When Mr. Marciszewski says that it's not "practically available" to them, what he's saying is that you can't copy and paste, you can't print out from the website. Those are not due process issues. Due process has to do with whether there's access to the information. And if they can read it, it's our position that it's just -- the additional functionality, which ICC does make available through a licensed form, is really a different issue.

But more to the point, if they want to make this argument that ICC limits the way that you can access the codes because you can't copy and paste, they can do that. They don't need documents. We are willing to stipulate that we make a free, read-only version of the website. We had this information as a live issue in the first copyright case. The parties have already had a full dispute through summary judgment in which ICC had the same read-only access through its reading room to its codes. And they're welcome to make those arguments again.

But what doesn't make sense to us is to have ICC search for a really burdensome request that is all documents and communications relating to feedback, which is not time-limited or otherwise limited, and would include requests like, gee, I really wish your website had larger font. Things that are just wholly irrelevant to this case when they don't need them to make the argument that Mr. Marciszewski is advancing, that read-only access is not enough, it needs to be searchable, or it needs to be able to be copied and pasted.

MR. MARCISZEWSKI: And real quick, if I may respond to that, Your Honor, I just want to point out that opposing counsel's description of what the due process standard is saying just because it's available to be read-only is enough. That is something that's a live dispute in this case, about if just having it where you can read it is enough, versus does it actually need to be, you know, like I say, "practically available," or usable to the general public.

THE COURT: Because I guess I'm confused as to why someone's, you know, potential complaint about that would be information you need to make the argument.

MR. MARCISZEWSKI: I think there's a difference of, you know, if there's one person making a claim versus if there is a series and it shows, you know, in the documents we get that everyone trying to use ICC free access, it's just not usable in their practical -- you know, what they use it for, their job. I think that will then become relevant to our argument saying, hey, this free access is not usable by anyone. Here's a long litany of people saying they cannot use it. And, you know, that would be our argument.

MS. WISE: I just don't -- you know, the volume here is so large that that, to me, doesn't really change the analysis. They do not need the search of comprehensive documents and communications regarding all feedback whatsoever from users with respect to our codes on our free website to make this argument. It seems much more like a broad fishing expedition.

MR. MARCISZEWSKI: And, Your Honor, we are more than willing to also narrow this scope, either by certain custodians at -- or certain e-mail addresses, certain search terms. We are willing to narrow this. It's just -- we have not gotten to that point in meet and confer because of ICC's

position that it's not relevant, but we are more than willing to really limit it to, I feel like, actual customer communications. You know, maybe it's not so much the broad documents, but -- so really what we're searching for is the actual customer communications to ICC.

THE COURT: Ms. Wise, you keep talking about burden. Do you -- how -- what is the volume of documents? Have you run, like, an initial search to see how many potential consumer or customer complaints there are?

MS. WISE: We have not. We have not searched for this because, like I said, we haven't seen any showing from the other side that it's relevant. But we have, in the context of our prior dispute before Your Honor, gone back and started to pull documents on consumer information, and we've collected lots of data. There are multiple e-mail inboxes through which ICC receives communications.

And, like I said, I think it would be very difficult to, you know, sort the wheat from the chaff on this. I don't know how we would get to, I wish we could copy and paste -- which we're, again, willing to concede that they can't -- from I wish your font was bigger or I wish the format of the

website was different. Things like that. I think we would have to review, you know, years of documents from consumers to find something that we're willing to stipulate they can't do.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. WISE: And just for context, the consumer -- the customer databases that we've pulled have millions of documents in them.

MR. MARCISZEWSKI: And, Judge, just one more point of relevance. I mean, ICC has made the assertions over and over in this case that not only are the codes available on the website, but the fact that they're easily accessible and anyone from the public can easily access and use them in the format they are in -- if ICC wants to continue making that argument, particularly with due process, UpCodes' position is that we're entitled to at least something. We can think about the narrowed scope of it, but we are entitled to document, to test whether that assertion is true or not.

MS. WISE: I just don't see how that's true. You -- UpCodes has sought summary judgment on this issue before without this information, so you're certainly capable of making the due process argument, and have made in the past the due process

argument, based on the read-only component of our website.

The ease of use, you know, if you want to walk the jury through our website and say, see how unfriendly it is, see how difficult it is to use our website, go for it. If you want to get an expert or run a survey that says, their website is difficult for these reasons, go ahead. But I don't think searching through, you know, a million documents is proportional to the cost in this case, where there's just no dispute that we don't make documents searchable.

I'm struggling to see why requiring these searches is necessary, given that the information seems to be something that you can easily stipulate to and is, you know, available just by virtue of going to the reading room. And they don't dispute that there is no ability to search or copy/paste or any of that.

MR. MARCISZEWSKI: I guess our position, the slight distinction is not just that what -- it's not that we want to know what are the features. We know what the features are. It's just that what is the effect of the people that are actually using it we find more relevant than if -- you know, if we

walk the jury through and the attorney's making the argument and we have no backing of what ICC users actually think about it. I think that's really the relevance of what we're looking for.

We can make that argument saying this isn't usable, it's not usable, but it just begs the question of, well, you say that, what do ICC users actually think? Can they use it? And that's why --

MS. WISE: Well --

MR. MARCISZEWSKI: -- we wanted customer feedback.

MS. WISE: Go ahead. I didn't mean to interrupt.

And we did point this out in our letter, that if, let's say, ten consumers in the last five years have wrote in and said, you can't copy and paste, they can't extrapolate that to a universe of all ICC users having that complaint, even if we produced those documents.

What they would need to run, like you do in many, many trademark cases to prove consumer beliefs is run a survey and find an appreciable number of users that can be extrapolated to the right universe of users. And that's how you tell what consumers are thinking. It's not by

cherrypicking one-off e-mails about what a particular consumer might want or wish or dream.

MR. MARCISZEWSKI: And, Your Honor, just the point is, I think there is a point of, if these documents come back and there's only two, five, ten e-mails, I think opposing counsel is right, that that turns into very cherrypicking, and they have every right to make that argument. But I think it just depends on the volume of complaints that come back. If it's hundreds and hundreds versus ten, that changes the calculus. But without even searching the documents, we don't know -- at least UpCodes does not know -- the volume of those complaints or feedback.

THE COURT: It sounded like, though, I heard Ms. Wise say that there wasn't -- you know, they have potentially, you know, a -- quite a sizable volume of these e-mails, and there's no way to limit the search accurately to just talk about complaints about the usability.

Is that correct, Ms. Wise?

MS. WISE: Yes.

MR. MARCISZEWSKI: And that -- I would just ask -- I mean, we can figure out search terms of just the actual usability that we're looking for;

either the words "copy/paste," the words "print," or something like that, that -- I don't know if -- we have not -- I don't believe ICC has run searches regarding maybe a narrow scope of certain inboxes for certain terms that highlight the functionality differences between ICC, a website and UpCodes' website that ICC has been pointing out.

But I believe if we do something -- if we can agree to certain, you know, inboxes and certain search terms -- I still could be wrong because I don't know the inboxes, but it could narrow down from -- it's not going to be millions anymore.

MS. WISE: I still think that that's the tail wagging the dog on its relevance, right? You know, if we have to search through these inboxes, I think it's going to yield a high volume of hits.

Just from the searching that we've done in other contexts, I really think that the volume is going to be quite high.

But at the end of the day, they would still need some expert analysis to say that the number that we receive is meaningful in some way, and they can do that with a survey without us looking for a single document.

THE COURT: All right. Let's just keep

moving on. There's still 2 and 3 in this section.

I think on number 8, for the reasons I've indicated, I'm not entirely sure why this information is not something that what you really think just shouldn't be done through a consumer survey. But I'm going to just table this a second because it does sound like there weren't any searches done initially to try to understand the volume that we were talking about, and it would be on ICC's -- it is ICC's burden to show that this would be unduly burdensome.

Although I am still struggling to see the relevance, so I understand your argument, Ms. Wise. But since 2 and 3 are in the same category, do we want to discuss those?

MR. MARCISZEWSKI: Yes, Your Honor.

Briefly, I just want to make the distinction with 2 and 3. The -- we've talked about due process a lot with 8. I think 2 and 3 are most relevant, more so to the market harm analysis of the fair use. It's mainly whether ICC offering its codes online for free, albeit with these certain limitations that they've talked about, if they've affected ICC's revenues or sales because it's ICC's central argument that UpCodes offering the law for

free harms the market for ICC codes. And if ICC's offerings -- if there's documents out there that says that has not affected their book sales or revenues, that would be relevant, therefore, to market harm.

and I know in the letters ICC has pointed out these functionality differences, but I believe getting these documents also will allow UpCodes to test whether those distinctions were actually considered when making these offerings. For example, if there's a document out there that says, hey, it's on a read-only format, but anyone can hit CTRL-P and print the page, are we concerned about that; and says, no, that's fine if people start printing it, it's not going to affect our book revenues, that's relevant.

Or on the flip side, if all decisions end to make the codes available for free, or after the fact, when discussing in relation to their revenues, that "copy, paste, print" never come up, then I think UpCodes is entitled to test whether this has been a consideration by ICC all along or if this is a theory just by litigation to make a distinction between UpCodes' and ICC's services that is a distinction without a difference.

MS. WISE: If that's -- if you're done, Mr. Marciszewski, I'll go ahead and respond.

MR. MARCISZEWSKI: Yes.

MS. WISE: The notion that something that happened several years before UpCodes existed was a litigation strategy strikes me as untenable. ICC, long before UpCodes existed, made its documents available in a read-only format for customers to go to its website. The decision-making process, as Judge Freeman already ruled, is not relevant once you know that we've made them available for free. That's just the fact. Whether ICC considered, you know, how many views to give people for free, or did -- you know, how -- should we track access or not; those are all within the scope of the request.

And I think one thing that we haven't really talked about is the narrowing that UpCodes is doing now to copy and paste. It didn't do so in the meet and confer. And so we haven't run search terms to limit the scope to meet and confer because that's not the scope of the request. The request as written, including number 8, requests all documents concerning free online access to services, which is number 2. And that's much broader than it's being painted here.

So our concern about the breadth of these requests is this volume of consumer requests that we get through these channels. It's huge. And UpCodes has not shown that they're willing to limit them in any way. And, frankly, we don't think they need them. As Judge Freeman said, it -- ICC freely admits that they make documents available for free on their website, and we did throughout the entire first copyright case.

A big portion of that case was fair use.

Notably, they never raised this argument the first time they sought these documents, so they clearly didn't think it was that important at that time.

But even Judge Marrero said that UpCodes' use is different in kind. We're not comparing apples and apples. We're comparing apples and oranges. ICC makes its documents available in a read-only format. That means people cannot send them to their friend. They can send the link to the website to their friend.

From UpCodes, you can do exactly the opposite. You can copy language and you can put it in an e-mail, you can copy entire code books. And that is substitutional to ICC's use. And that's right in Judge Marrero's opinion about the market

harm on Factor 4. So if they were able to brief summary judgment and make this argument without these documents last time, we simply don't see why ICC should undergo the burden of searching millions of documents this time around when it seems entirely unnecessary and disproportionate.

MR. MARCISZEWSKI: And, Your Honor, just a few clarifying things.

I think opposing counsel is right when we talk about RFP 8, about limiting to the functionalities of copy/paste. But I think in 2 and 3, what we're -- what UpCodes is really more looking for are more internal documents, you know. And we're willing to think about a universe of maybe more formal documents or board presentations and minutes, that we're really looking at the market harm on that one more so than the distinguishing features. It's that offering the codes for free online, has that affected ICC's revenues? That is really the question there.

And just a real point with Judge Freeman, talked about the decision-making in the prior hearing. He said regarding due process, the decision isn't really relevant to due process because it was -- it's either available or it's not,

or the features are what they are. That was his logic. He did not discuss regarding market harm, which these really go to, are the potential market harm because, it's -- you know, as opposing counsel points out, their argument is going to be UpCodes and ICC is apples-to-oranges comparison, you can't make it. And that's fine, that when, you know, we get to a brief, then we can make that argument. But it does not mean that we're not entitled to at least get these documents to say, hey, ICC's free offering does not affect their revenues at all, if that is true, if there's documents that say that.

And then, you know, it would be UpCodes' then position and our argument that will say that UpCodes' offering is similar enough to ICC's that it would not affect the market. Obviously, opposing counsel will disagree with that position, but that legal argument and that, that it was at summary judgment last time and will probably be briefed again, isn't a stop to allow UpCodes for some of these documents in order to at least get that information whether ICC's free offerings has affected their revenues and sales.

THE COURT: Ms. Wise, what about the -- since it sounds like the parties hadn't really

looked at narrowing the request, why is narrowing 2 and 3 to look at specifically any impact on revenues or other income streams from offering it for free online? Would that not adequately address your concern that this is potentially looking at, you know, millions of irrelevant documents?

MS. WISE: I think the best answer to that is that they're getting those documents in response to other requests. So when Mr.

Marciszewski talks about getting data to compare, we are producing documents responsive to views of ICC's free website. We're producing documents about how that compares to our paid-license services. So if they want to say, you know, since the time that ICC introduced the free online website -- they can compare that to the paid version with the documents that we're going to produce.

What we don't think are relevant are individual employee e-mails about the decision back in -- I don't know the exact time frame, but I'm going to say 2012 because I believe it was live in -- later than that. So for just frame of reference, in 2012 the documents that ICC considered about whether to offer the access for free just doesn't strike us as relevant. And, you know, the

marketplace is how it exists now, not all the options that ICC considered in making the decision whether to offer it or not.

And I do think -- just to reframe a little bit and respond to what Mr. Marciszewski was saying about Judge Marrero's decision, our point is not that these issues have been decided. Our point was that they had sought documents regarding this decision making in the last case, the Copyright 1 case. And this case is very similar in terms of the issues that the parties disputed, and they didn't get these documents because they were found to be irrelevant.

We understand that last time they argued due process and didn't choose to argue this fair use, that's certainly their choice not to have pursued it at that time, but they still made this argument about our free offering impacting market harm. So if they're making that argument and Judge Marrero just, you know, considered it, they don't need these documents.

THE COURT: Although it sounds like you started off by saying they were already getting it from other sources.

MS. WISE: No. They're getting the --

the documents that they're getting from other sources are the data of the -- to make a comparison between our free offering and our paid offering. They don't need -- the documents that they don't need are internal communications about decisions to offer free access or internal communications about how our website -- how our codes can be accessed.

MR. MARCISZEWSKI: And, Your Honor, just to put a point, clarify something I might have said earlier is we're willing to, kind of, start narrowing this because, again, we've had disputes about more relevance. We get that we're maybe getting the data from somewhere else. But what we also think is relevant is not every single employee's e-mail, but if things are -- you know, were discussed at a board meeting, or if there was a PowerPoint at a board presentation, or maybe e-mails among executives about the free offerings, that then -- that those free offerings -- you know, not just so much the decision the first time, but whether to continue doing it.

If it says, hey, is the free offering hurting our sales? No, it's not, let's continue doing it. Or this -- whatever they might say in those documents, that's really what we are looking

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      for, is not just the raw data that maybe we can make
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      extrapolations from, but whether ICC itself has
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     noticed that this, you know, offering that it has
     hasn't affected its book sales or isn't hurting its
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     revenue streams. That is what really -- that's,
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     kind of, the fine point of what we're looking for.
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                 THE COURT: The free offering began in
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     2012, I think someone said.
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                MS. WISE: I think discussions about the
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      free offering would have been around that time,
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     yeah.
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                 THE COURT: And when did UpCodes enter
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     the market?
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                MS. WISE: Around 2017. You all may know
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     better than I do, but the lawsuit was certainly
      2017; so maybe shortly before that.
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                MR. MARCISZEWSKI: That's correct.
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                THE COURT: Okay. So I quess, Ms. Wise,
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      I'm just -- it sounds like defense counsel has, at
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     least, substantially narrowed this request. And
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     we're talking about -- it doesn't even seem like
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     this internal communication so much as, like, you
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     know, formal presentations or documents outlining
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     the potential, you know, loss in revenues of any or
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     market harm from offering the service for free.
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1 I thought I heard you say that that would not be 2 information they would get from another request. 3 MS. WISE: I --THE COURT: But it also doesn't seem like 4 5 this would be voluminous or burdensome. MS. WISE: I'm trying to think if it 6 7 would be in other requests. I honestly don't -- I 8 hadn't considered that. I think one of the 9 struggles that I'm having here is that there was a 10 long meet and confer process, and the motion that's 11 before Your Honor is on the request as written. 12 They have not, prior to now, offered to narrow. And 13 so I could have investigated, you know, potential 14 narrowings before now. 15 I think the appropriate response would be 16 to deny the motion. That -- the requests, as 17 written, are extremely overly broad, as Counsel has 18 showed by jumping to narrow it immediately. As 19 written, they're just not relevant and are already 20 demonstrated by the access that ICC makes available. 21 I'm not sure what a board document from 2012 is 22 going to tell them about ICC's current marketplace 23 and the harm that UpCodes' substantially different 24 use is going to show. 25 THE COURT: Okay. Look, I hear the -- it

sounds like the motion potentially could have been avoided, but we're here now. I agree that, as written, Requests 2 and 3 are too broad, but it sounds like there's potentially a far narrower request that can be considered.

And I -- you know, unless you want to point me to specifically where this was already considered before either Judge Freeman or Judge Marrero, I'm happy to look at that, but it sounded like maybe the request made then was also different than the more narrow request we're talking about now.

I sort of -- I do actually see his argument on relevance for this far narrow request when he's -- when we're looking at the decision to have even offered this for free in the initial instance, about whether it would have affected, you know, their potential revenue sources. But it does sound like there's potentially some resolution here that, at least, could be considered before -- you know, before a final ruling on 2 and 3.

But -- so just to take a step back, as written, I agree with you, 2 and 3 are too broad, but Counsel has offered something far narrower, and since that wasn't considered by the parties, I'd

like the parties to just, at least, go and figure out whether this is -- whether, in fact, these documents exist and whether they would be voluminous or burdensome to search for. Because it does sound like he's looking -- he's no longer looking for internal communications.

MS. WISE: So, if possible, I think one solution would be for UpCodes to serve a narrowed request so that we can look at it and then start to evaluate the request on its face. Because I think what's happened in the discussion process is I don't have a, you know, actual request to look from. I can go with my understanding of how it's narrowed, but then the parties are just going to have a dispute about, you know, what exactly did we agree to. If UpCodes is willing to serve a narrowed request, we'd be happy to look at it.

THE COURT: Okay. Sure. Go ahead.

MR. MARCISZEWSKI: Sorry, Your Honor. I just wanted to point out that during the meet and confer process, although there was not any formalized offers of narrowing, we -- UpCodes showed the willingness -- I mean, particularly on 8 from my notes, that, hey, we can have certain custodians, we can limit this in time. There was -- you know,

offered up, but ICC really stood on the grounds that none of these are relevant whatsoever.

And I think, even from Counsel's point that some of these documents seem to also -- being produced maybe in other requests, shows that there's at least -- you know, maybe they're a bit too far broad, but they are, at least, relevant. And I think just having that to go back -- instead of coming up with new requests that we're going to try and start this process all over, to have a meaningful meet and confer about how this can be narrowed in a way that alleviates burden would it be helpful with the knowledge that, hey, these documents are relevant now. And it, kind of, would push us through that impasse on the relevance argument.

MS. WISE: Is it -- my understanding that -- I don't think -- Judge, did you say that you thought Request 8 was relevant? Because I don't think limiting --

THE COURT: No. I wasn't speaking about Request 8. I was speaking specifically about 2 and 3.

MR. MARCISZEWSKI: Yes.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MARCISZEWSKI: And I apologize. I did not mean to queue it that way.

THE COURT: Sorry. Sorry. I just -- I'm just really talking about 2 and 3. I get that this process seems to have been -- it's moving a little bit backwards, given that there wasn't, you know, a formal narrowed request served.

about was this idea that there would be something other than internal communication. So formal presentation is, I think, what Mr. Marciszewski had indicated. And at least once we get out of the bucket of internal communications, there had been no indication from Ms. Wise that these — that there would — that this request would be unduly burdensome when we're just looking at any analysis that was done with regards to the — with regards to the impact of revenues from a free offering of the codes, so...

MS. WISE: I just don't know the answer to that. I do want to reserve the right to say that it might be. I just haven't -- we're so far down the path of a different request than what this motion to compel was initially about that I just don't know.

THE COURT: Yeah, no, and I hear that, and so that's why I had suggested, you know, if the parties can go back and, sort of, figure out if this request can be narrowed in the way that's been indicated on the phone call and whether that would pose, you know, a voluminous -- would produce a voluminous amount of documents.

If what you want is a -- you know, an updated formal request, I don't think that should be something that's too hard to put together, since it's -- it is, like -- we've, now, very much substantively limited the request.

MR. MARCISZEWSKI: That works for UpCodes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. And then with regards to 8, as I had indicated, you know, I still don't see why this information is necessary, given that they're willing to stipulate to it, and you would otherwise have to use a survey to show, you know, customer preferences or functionality or use and the difficulties arising from the fact that you can't copy and paste and the like.

But if you want to point me to a case or something else that would -- that could potentially change my mind, I'm happy to look at it, but as it

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stands on number 8, I'm not -- I think, as written in the motion, I'm going to deny -- I'm going to deny the motion to compel on that one.
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MR. MARCISZEWSKI: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I think the next category is

15 and 17.

MR. MARCISZEWSKI: Yes, Your Honor. I think it might also be easier just to take 17 by itself because I believe ICC has written in their response that they're willing to search for, I believe, documents sufficient to show whether ICC intended or encouraged jurisdictions to adopt codes into law.

And I think this really stems from -many courts consider, and I believe this Court in
its previous order has considered whether a
privately authored work becomes the law on
government adoption. One of the factors that can be
considered is whether ICC intends or encouraged that
work to be adopted into law.

Our only position is -- we're okay -that was -- the point of our original RFP was we
read it as whether ICC intended or encouraged
jurisdictions to adopt codes into law. We would
just still push that we want the -- you know, all

documents, communications, related to that rather than sufficient to show because it's, kind of, an open question of whether ICC does that or not. And I feel like ICC might have a different position than us. So we would just then say we want all document comms regarding whether ICC intended or encouraged jurisdictions to adopt codes into law.

MS. WISE: I'm sorry. I'm at a little bit of a loss. I understood Request 7 to seek -- I'm sorry -- 17 to ask for "documents and communications related to lobbying efforts, including communications with lobbyists regarding your adoption."

And in UpCodes' brief, they said that that was because they wanted -- they believed that those documents show whether ICC intended or encouraged the work's adoption into law. And in response to that, we are willing to provide documents sufficient to show whether ICC intended or encouraged the work's adoption into law.

Those documents were provided in Copyright 1. In terms of Judge Marrero's decision, he found there was no -- it's undisputed that ICC encourages adoption of its codes, pointing to some sample ordinances that ICC had produced. We are

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willing to produce similar documents for the
additional codes in this case. And I don't think
the documents beyond that are necessary. Certainly
not all documents and communications relating to
lobbying efforts, which is how the request, as
stated in the motion to compel was written.
           THE COURT: Ms. Wise, can I -- exactly
what are you willing -- what -- how would you be
willing to limit the request and produce documents?
           MS. WISE: We'd be willing to limit the
request to documents sufficient to show ICC's intent
or encouragement of the work's adoption into law.
           THE COURT: Would that not include,
potentially, lobbying efforts and communications
with lobbyists?
           MS. WISE: You know, I think "lobbying"
is, kind of, a vaque term as to what it means, but
as it's written in the request, the lobbying efforts
are entirely unrelated to adoption.
                                     So --
           THE COURT: But now if you're limiting it
to adoption, would it include, in your view,
lobbying efforts to try to get a code adopted into
law?
           MS. WISE: I don't -- I don't think so.
I think what we have, just for your context --
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THE COURT: So how would the lobbying efforts not be something like -- why wouldn't that come with an encouraged?

MS. WISE: Because what we had asked was sufficient to show. So I don't think that what we had in mind was sufficient to show was that we would go through the vast number of people who deal with jurisdictions on a daily basis and determine on a document-by-document, e-mail-by-e-mail basis, whether a particular document was encouraging adoption.

What we do have are, at the start of each code book, there is sample ordinances, sample legislation, that is, you know, provided with ICC's code book that says, this is how you can adopt our code into law.

I don't know that they're going to get a clearer example of ICC intent or encouragement of adoption of its code book than a sample ordinance. So does it need individual communications with 50 jurisdictions, with just states, and with every locality that ICC, true to its word with the sample ordinances is intending that they be adopted?

THE COURT: And so for every code that you have, you have this sample ordinance or

1 legislation that for each one provides how the 2 process could be done to adopt it into law? 3 MS. WISE: I believe so, yeah. 4 THE COURT: And just going back to 5 defense counsel, why is that not sufficient? MR. MARCISZEWSKI: 6 I believe that might 7 be sufficient. The issue that I had originally is 8 that it was just confusing to say "sufficient to show" whether ICC does something or not. It just 9 10 leaves open the question of if ICC is going to give 11 documents to show that it's not lobbying or 12 intenting, or if it was. 13 That was, kind of, the concern I had, 14 that it was confusing, the limitation, as it was 15 written. That if -- really, if it comes to 16 documents, there -- I think we're willing to be okay 17 with that "sufficient to show" if it's truly --18 these are documents that show they are encouraging 19 and they want to adopt into law, that's fine. Or even if ICC is willing to stipulate, saying, we 20 21 encourage every single one of our codes to be 22 adopted into law, that's really what we're trying to 23 get at. And that's fine, too, that -- if ICC has 24 that type of position. 25 And last, I just want to point out,

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Your Honor, I might be moving backward, but the original RFP was talking about -- regarding adoption of your codes. So that's really that -- that point of it because they're willing to stipulate to it. I don't think we really care about the internal communications or the communications with jurisdictions if that's just going to be duplicative and not necessary.

THE COURT: Let me just -- let me just ask.
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Even absent a stipulation, though, if she's saying that they have these, basically a how-to adopt this -- how -- a step-by-step guide or some sample document that explains how it should be -- how it can be adopted into law, that seems to me to be sufficient to show that they're encouraging that the code be adopted into law, even if they're -- even if she's not going to agree to a stipulation on this.

MR. MARCISZEWSKI: Well, I mean, that's -- that would be fine. I think our concern is if that's all we have and then we make the argument later, and they come back and say, well, just because we print that at the beginning, that doesn't mean we're actually encouraging certain

jurisdictions to adopt it, and trying to gain -trying to, you know, weave that path through, that
would be the issue.

But if -- what it sounds like -- at least, from opposing counsel's representations -- that that's not likely to happen. I think we're okay with just the sample ordinances if it's not going to come back later, that ICC's going to try to make a distinction when we use that and say, look, they're encouraging, intending all of their works to be adopted into law.

THE COURT: Ms. Wise, I just want to, I guess, understand. That -- is -- that doesn't sound like an argument you'd be making later, but I guess now would be the time to clear that up if that is potentially something that would become an issue later.

MS. WISE: I -- so I don't think that we're willing to stipulate, particularly without conferring with our client. And I don't -- I think the words "adopted into law" have a really specific meaning in this case. I don't think we're trying to hide the ball. I don't think that we're trying to be unclear about what we're offering to give to them.

What we're more than happy to produce is what Judge Marrero relied on in the first copyright case, which are the sample ordinances that he show -- said, I think, along with some additional deposition testimony, was that it's undisputed that ICC encourages adoption of its codes. So I think what we're giving -- or what we're willing to give UpCodes has already been shown to be enough on this point. But I don't think I can go as far as a stipulation; certainly not without conferring with my client.

MR. MARCISZEWSKI: Your Honor, I completely understand about not wanting to stipulate right now in this hearing. I understand Counsel's position there.

But I'll just say what was just said, kind of, then starts begging the question of, are those, you know, sample ordinances a beginning? Is that just saying, hey, jurisdictions — the argument — jurisdictions, you can create laws like this, or this is a sample to work off of. Or whether, you know — and this may be where communications come in — someone tells a jurisdiction, hey, you can adopt our codes as—is into law, you know, and they can incorporate a

reference, or you adopt it by reference into law.

That would then become where communications may be more relevant.

If we're starting to make that distinction of what does "adopt into law" mean, that, then, becomes a more trickier area if we're just relying on the sample ordinance and have nothing more versus if this is going to be a thinly lined argument about what a document law means, UpCodes would then want to see some of those communications and see if that language is used by ICC when communicating to jurisdictions.

I'm -- you know, I just want to be clear on this. I had understood, I guess, Ms. Wise to be saying, look, we have these sample ordinance, sample legislation, it's provided for all our codes, and previously Judge Marrero found that is -- you know, it's undisputed that this is what encouraged the jurisdictions that ICC -- this showed that ICC encourages jurisdictions to adopt into law.

I think -- it sounds to me like what they're willing to provide you should be sufficient, absent some later argument that now quibbles over what "adoption" means. And so that's why I was

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trying to ask, you know, not necessarily to a
     stipulation, but if there's going to be an issue --
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     because maybe this didn't come up before
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     Judge Marrero before, but if there was going to be
     an issue as to what "adoption" means, then I
     thought, you know, potentially our compromise here
     wouldn't necessarily make sense. But it's -- I'm
     not sure...
                MS. WISE: I think the sticking point --
     and I'm sorry. I may have just interrupted you.
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                THE COURT: No. Go ahead.
                MS. WISE: I think the sticking point is
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     not whether ICC encourages adoption. It's the "into
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     law," right? The parties have a big dispute about
     whether ICC maintains its copyright when
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     jurisdictions incorporate their model codes and
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     standards by reference, whether that then becomes
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     the law. And, you know, in our conversations with
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     UpCodes on their request, they've said, you know, we
     might not respond in the exact words that you use in
     your request because we don't want to have an
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     inherent admission about the larger issues in this
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     case. And that's all we're saying.
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                We're willing to give the documents that
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they want on this encouragement issue. I think that

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it's been shown that those documents are going to
be, you know, the ones that UpCodes intend to rely
on. So I'm not really clear on why they're pushing
for this now when they've relied on them in the
past. But I don't think we're trying to be cute
about it.
           We just are not going to admit something
that has a bigger implication for the case.
           THE COURT: Okay. Okay. So then I think
as to 17, I get your position, Ms. Wise. I think we
should -- as we've -- as you narrowed it in your
letter and as we've discussed, the sample ordinance,
sample legislation sufficient to show whether ICC
intended or encouraged the work's adoption into law,
it sounds like the parties have agreed on, at least,
that narrowed request, and defense counsel is
willing to accept that.
           MR. MARCISZEWSKI: Yes, Your Honor.
           THE COURT: Is there an issue as to 15
then?
           MR. MARCISZEWSKI: Yes.
                                   It -- 15 is --
and I can -- it also probably relates a little
bit -- the arguments I'm going to make for 18 are
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The issues there are basically whether testing if ICC's positions -- in this case, if

going to be pretty much the same.

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they're making litigation -- and what their past positions are. So there's really two issues. It's about willful infringement of UpCodes and also, if nothing else, for impeachment purposes. Really ICC is making broad assertions of what the copyright is. And to the extent that this position is contrary to what positions ICC has taken before about the extent of its copyrights, UpCodes is entitled to that.

And as well as for willful infringement, ICC's belief to the extent of its copyright is relevant to whether UpCodes' belief was reasonable, whether it was, you know, willful infringement or not. For example, if there's documents out there that ICC believe that, when codes are adopted, they're the law and they can't be copyrighted, or even if there's documents saying that, hey, it's kind of unclear what this is, then that's relevant to whether UpCodes' belief at the time, that this is not copyrighted material, this is the law, and how -- whether, objectively, that was reasonable or not. ICC's same belief as the copyright owner, who should probably know even better, is then, therefore, relevant to whether UpCodes' belief was reasonable as to willful infringement.

THE COURT: Ms. Wise?

MS. WISE: I -- so first, I don't think ICC's -- well, ICC's belief is that it owns the copyright in all of these codes. It would not have brought a lawsuit in bad faith to begin with. To say that it doesn't have copyright privately and to bring more than one copyright lawsuit, I think, would be ludicrous.

But even setting that aside, ICC's subjective views on copyright protection just are irrelevant. The Supreme Court has weighed in on this, and they said that if you look at the purpose and character of the use, which is what UpCodes has said that this goes to in the fair-use analysis, the Supreme Court said that is an objective inquiry. So whether the work has copyright or not, I think the people to look to are the Copyright office, who has again and again, registered ICC's works.

All of the inquiry about whether UpCodes' beliefs are objectively reasonable go to what UpCodes knew. And UpCode didn't know anything about ICC's internal subjective views when it made these decisions. The case that they point to, this Scanlon case, I think, exemplifies that, right.

They have a copyright owner who provided certain works for certain purposes, and there was

ambiguity as to what defendants knew or didn't know about the policy of the organization where those images had been shared. So the willfulness inquiry in that case was really, you know, was defendant's belief about what the copyright policy of the organization was reasonable under the circumstances.

UpCodes didn't have any belief about ICC's subjective views. So I don't see how it informs anything about UpCodes' willfulness. The objective facts that UpCodes was aware of when it posted these new documents is that ICC had sued them once for copyright infringement. So their reasonableness or not reasonableness should be viewed in light of the circumstances when they chose to post the additional works, not internal ICC communication.

MR. MARCISZEWSKI: And, Your Honor, just really two quick points. First was brought up about the fair use being an objective test. That is true. It does not mean that any subjective views are completely irrelevant, it's just that the test that is used is an objective standard.

Moving really quick to the willful infringement point, our argument is not that UpCodes knew what ICC was thinking and, therefore, relied on

ICC. The point being is that the fact that UpCodes, at the time when making decisions, was equal if not less than the information that ICC had. And I'm not trying to suggest ICC is bringing these litigations in bad faith, that, you know — that when they sue, they believe they have copyright and there has been copyright infringement. But if there is documents at some point when there was questions about it, or they didn't believe, or there was ambiguity, or they go, I'm not 100 percent sure, we need to figure this out. That ambiguity, as the copyright owner, who should know more than anyone, can show that there's, you know, gray lines here that doesn't show that UpCodes was willfully infringing.

MS. WISE: So I guess what I'm --

THE COURT: Can I just ask you a question on willful infringement, because just I -- the -- if UpCodes was aware that ICC was putting this information out under the color or cover of a copyright, I'm confused as to why whether ICC subjectively believed that maybe potentially its copyright either wasn't as strong or as it, you know, might have portrayed it to be, why that would go to what -- to the willfulness of UpCodes' conduct because UpCodes wouldn't have been aware of anything

ICC was thinking behind the scenes. It just knew that ICC had put this information out there and had indicated that it was copyright.

MR. MARCISZEWSKI: Right. Your Honor, it goes really to almost credibility of their argument of saying that there was willful infringement.

Because UpCodes' position is that we are not copying ICC's copyrighted material. What we are posting is what is the law. And our position is that you cannot copyright what's in the law.

And there is -- you know, we can have -- I don't want to devolve this into legal arguments here, but if there is internal communications at ICC saying, you know, once something's adopted into law, I'm not sure what copyright might have if it's identical to the law that might not be copyrighted. Those type of questions can show that even if the copyright owners think that there might be a question, that it's reasonable for UpCodes to believe that, if I'm posting the law, that is not copyright infringement. And that would be then relevant to the willful infringement analysis.

THE COURT: And wouldn't those communications that you're potentially pointing to -- it sounds like those should be almost -- could

potentially almost all be privileged.

MR. MARCISZEWSKI: Right. And I guess we are, obviously, not looking for any privileged documents. And we're willing to work, too, you know, if there's -- a privilege log might be another burden. If there's too many of that, then fine. And if it's -- if all of them are privileged and there's no documents -- the only time they've ever had this discussion is with counsel then -- and I'll have the position that it's an easy response to come back and say there's no documents that aren't privileged to it.

And that's the same for -- I guess that also relates to 18, about that NFPA v. UpCodes litigation. If all of those communications end up being privileged, then it's a fairly simple response of "they're all privileged," and we can work out whether a privilege log is necessary or not.

MS. WISE: I think that, sort of, jumps the preliminary hurdle. If the question here is whether these are relevant to willfulness, willfulness is asking about UpCodes' state of mind. I don't think anything UpCodes didn't know about sheds light on UpCodes' state of mind. So I don't feel like we've cleared the initial hurdle.

Whether or not we have to produce a privilege log, the burden of reviewing documents, mainly between counsel, as Your Honor pointed out, many of these are going to be privileged. The review of that doesn't lessen because we don't produce a privilege log.

I think, additionally, what are we going to search for? Are we going to search for copyright? I mean, copyright appears on every single ICC code. It's just a voluminous way to get at something that, at the end of the day, doesn't move the needle on whether UpCodes was willful or not because it didn't know what ICC's internal communications were, so it can't have had any bearing on their state of mind.

MR. MARCISZEWSKI: Your Honor, real quick, again, I mean, I'm not going to try to start doing narrowing or suggesting certain search terms live again, as I've done before. I'll just stick to the relevance issues.

Again, it's not that UpCodes relied on it. It's that if ICC is making the argument that the fact that UpCodes knew, obviously, we're going to argue that we believed it was not copyright infringement, what we did. Obviously, ICC is going

to argue that it was.

I think it is relevant that if UpCodes can say, hey, you're arguing that what we did is copyright infringement and we should have known about it and, therefore, you were willful -- whether there is internal documents and communications that ICC at times had questions about whether, you know, their copyright extended to what was adopted into law, that is very relevant that if ICC had mixed views on that. Then they can't just sit here and argue that, obviously, UpCodes should have known and that it's obviously willful infringement if they themselves, knowing even more information than UpCodes, came to similar conclusions that UpCodes, at least at certain points of times -- or were at least ambiguous to it.

THE COURT: Okay. Is the last one number

19? Do we want to just touch upon that one?

MR. MARCISZEWSKI: Yes, Your Honor. I

can do this quickly as well.

Just for an overview, what the request seeks is the documents that are related to proposed legislation that ICC and other similar organizations have proposed, that basically vindicates their position in this litigation, that code is being

incorporated by reference into law does not affect their copyrightability so long as the publisher makes them available for free for public viewing.

So to the extent there are non-privileged documents about the way that proposed bill would change the current law, that's relevant to the merits of ICC's position under the current law. And even if ICC believed its copyright interest were unaffected by being adopted into law, but just wanted the bill to clear up the uncertainty about the law, I would bring that back to the points they're making about willful infringement. Because if the law is uncertain, then there's no argument that UpCodes' infringement can be willful.

THE COURT: Ms. Wise?

MS. WISE: I thought UpCodes' prior position was related to the impact on market harm. I think our position on this is going to be remarkably similar to our position on Request 8, that ICC doesn't dispute that it makes its codes available for free in a read-only format. I don't think anything in the proposed Pro Codes legislation impacts that.

Whether -- there is legislation that's being considered, but is not law, would require ICC

to do something that it does already. I don't see how that bears on the fair-use analysis. I don't know how, again, ICC's subjective views about whether something will or will not become law at some point bears on UpCodes' state of mind.

And I don't think looking for our subjective opinions on that, again, really turn the dial one way or the other. ICC makes its reading room available for free. If the Pro Codes Act were to pass, ICC would make its reading room available for free. So how that bears on this copyright case is not particularly clear to me.

MR. MARCISZEWSKI: Your Honor, real quick, because opposing counsel is right, that we made the point about Markham that I failed to mention, so I just want to point that out in a very succinct way that I think it does -- it is wrong. Opposing counsel is right, but if the Pro Codes Act passes, they won't have to change what they do because it only talks about read-only access to being available.

But in the process of lobbying for and trying to get this bill passed, if there are communications about why it should be only read only and copy and paste shouldn't be allowed, or

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downloading shouldn't be allowed, or if there's communication saying, you know what, if the Pro Codes Act passes, we're willing to -- if they say you have to be able to print it, too, or download it, that's fine with us, as long as there's not copy/paste, or whatever, you know, different iterations.

I could play the hypothetical game forever about what these communications could or couldn't say without looking at them. But I think the discussion with these features, in trying to pass a bill, if they really are strictly -- only wanted read-only or nothing, or if there's a willingness to have other features without fear that it might -- if we have to do this and it might affect our other revenues in order to ensure copyrightability, I think that is relevant then to market harm because then it shows that -- again, the arguments about the copy, paste, printing, downloads might be -- distinguishes without a difference that these -- UpCodes -- I mean, ICC would not intend it to actually affect its revenues if it's not, you know, always been gung ho about this or nothing. it's willing to have those at some point in the bill, but it never came to be, I think that would be

1 then relevant from our end. 2 MS. WISE: I --THE COURT: But it sounds like -- I mean, 3 I -- it sounds like even now what you're really 5 keeping it for is just a very narrow subset of what 6 the request is asking for. And I'm just wondering now that we've talked about market harm in the 7 8 context of the potential revision to Requests -- I think it was 2 and 3 -- if that wouldn't encompass 9 10 this idea that if you had to now change the 11 functionality, it would -- you know, whether they 12 did any analysis for a potential impact on the 13 revenue. 14 MR. MARCISZEWSKI: Right. And, 15 Your Honor, I think that is correct, and it's one of 16 the reasons why when I first started talking about 17 this, I didn't bring up the market harm, because I 18 believe market harm -- some of these other requests 19 might address it a little bit better than this one. 20 This one, again, is -- I would just 21 reemphasize some of those willful infringement and 22 as well as what ICC's position about its 23 copyrightability of its codes -- or its copyright 24 interest extend. 25 MS. WISE: And I think our position on

willfulness and copyrightability are the same as they were before. Copyrightability is objective and UpCodes' state of mind with respect to willfulness is not something that ICC's internal communications or even communications with others are -- is going to shed any light on.

THE COURT: Okay. At least as to Request Number 19, I'm going to -- I think on that one as the request is written and for all the reasons

Ms. Wise has indicated, I'm really struggling to see why this is relevant.

I think the only other one that I owe you an answer on was 15; is that correct? Did I miss any?

MS. WISE: I think that's right.

MR. MARCISZEWSKI: And I guess 15 and 18 are -- we kind of discussed them together. So if you want to flesh out the exact language of 18, we can.

The only point I want to make with -I'll just point out 18, the legal arguments I'm all
going to make are the same. But just to point out
that that RFP that we served, ICC served pretty much
an identical RFP on us recently. And just to point
out that UpCodes is willing to basically do the same

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      sort of production in a reciprocal manner, that
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     whatever Your Honor believes is right for RFP 18,
     that's how we'll respond and produce the documents
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     of the identical one served onto us by ICC.
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                 THE COURT: Ms. Wise, did you guys serve
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     the same request as 18?
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                 MS. WISE: We did, but for a very
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     different reason. So, as we said in our letter, ICC
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     is not a party to the NFPA v. UpCodes case, but
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     UpCodes is. If UpCodes made a statement against
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     their interest in documents connected to the NFPA
     case, then that is relevant. If ICC had
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     communications regarding the NFPA case, it isn't.
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                 THE COURT: I see. Okay.
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                 And of -- and it, of course, has you --
16
     okay.
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                 So Mr. Marciszewski, I'm really -- I do
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     apologize.
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                 MR. MARCISZEWSKI: That's all right.
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                 THE COURT: Can you just say it one more
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     time just --
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                 MR. MARCISZEWSKI: Oh --
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                 THE COURT: -- maybe by the end of the
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     conference, I can get it right.
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                 MR. MARCISZEWSKI: Oh, Marciszewski.
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THE COURT: Okay. Why -- can you just -- why, again, do you need the documents you seek in RFP 18?

MR. MARCISZEWSKI: Oh, I think it's for similar reasons that opposing counsel has talked --while ICC is not a party to the litigation, it is definitely very, very similar issues; namely, the question of whether the codes, when adopted, are the law or they're still subject to copyright. And the same way that opposing counsel says if we've made a statement inconsistent, they would want that. We'd argue that if someone, you know, asks ICC about the position, and if they make a claim, something that's inconsistent, we'd want that as well.

And I just want to point, in our meet and confers, I believe one of the biggest issues with 18 was about the privilege, you know, that there's a lot of these documents that meet privilege. And I would just argue that, for UpCodes, the burden is even higher. Given that we are a party in the litigation, there are a lot more privilege documents that we would have and a lot more documents than ICC.

So the burden is greater for us. We're seeking similar things, even if it's UpCodes as a

party versus it's the exact same issue, and does ICC take different positions when in litigation or, you know, their views on parallel litigation. And we are willing to make those productions and comply with these RFPs in a reciprocal manner, as I said.

THE COURT: But why is their view about a litigation they're not even involved in relevant?

MR. MARCISZEWSKI: It is because due to the legal issues. The legal issues are very parallel. And the one specifically that we're looking at is whether they've had the position that -- whether the codes, when adopted, are the law.

If they have made inconsistent statements regarding, say that NFPA, when they got their preliminary injunction denied, if there was questions like, well, maybe we don't have the copyright in the law. Or how can even expand it out to just inconsistent positions, but maybe market harm if there is — that when the PI is denied, there's internal communication saying, yeah, this is going to really affect our market now, if we don't have copyright interest in it, or the reverse side, that they're not really worried about it, that can be relevant.

It's really about not so much that it was a party to this litigation, what it was doing, but that there are communications about this litigation that are very parallel issues. That is what we're searching for, to the extent that it's not privileged.

MS. WISE: I will just address the privilege concern. I find it hard to think of a document in this context that would not be privileged. And, again, the parties' stipulation that we don't have to produce a privilege log for communications between outside counsel and the parties is certainly something that they've agreed to, to reduce the burden on themselves. But it doesn't mean that we should review all sorts of documents that are going to be primarily, if not exclusively, privileged.

UpCodes, in its motion, offered no explanation for why it wanted these NFPA documents. And the arguments that it has raised now are about UpCodes' state of mind and copyrightability, neither of which ICC's subjective beliefs shed any light on. So I don't think that these are relevant.

If NFPA lost a preliminary injunction based on its copyrighted works, that doesn't tell

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you anything about the copyrightability of ICC's works. It just doesn't. So I don't agree that that information, even if that conversation was happening, is relevant.
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THE COURT: Okay. I think on 18, that one might be the -- again, on this one, I think, given the potential that all of these -- if not all, a large number of these communications would be privileged. The burden of having to go through them, review them, even without having to log them, still seems disproportional to the (inaudible). And I -- even then, I'm still not clear as to why they would be relevant to UpCodes' state of mind or to any potential issue here.

So as to 18, I'm going to deny the request. I think the only one I owe you an answer on is 15. I just want to take a look at -- I have the request in front of me, but I just want to take a look at the 2020 decision, I guess, and what the parties have been calling "Copyright 1." And I will just memo endorse the last letter, giving you a decision on 15.

MS. WISE: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Is there anything --

MR. MARCISZEWSKI: Thank you, Your Honor.

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                   THE COURT: Okay. If there's nothing
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       else, then I'll issue that relatively shortly.
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       Thank you, everyone.
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## C E R T I F I C A T EI, Adrienne M. Mignano, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the case of International Code Council, Inc. v. UpCodes, Inc.; Docket #17CV6261 was prepared using digital transcription software and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Signature Adrienne M. Mignano ADRIENNE M. MIGNANO, RPR Date: August 11, 2023

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